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AMBIGUITY IN THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
California spends in excess of $400,000,000 a year for highway
construction contracts. In the fiscal year 1964-65 this expenditure
involved 563 major construction contracts.' On a smaller scale, the
counties and cities similarly expend large amounts each year to insure
that travel facilities measure up to the demands of an ever increasing
population. The accumulation of capital investment in -this area
serves to magnify the necessity for clarity and precision in defining
the limits of responsibility of the state as well as of the bidding
contractor. Recent litigation has introduced some conflict concerning
the interpretation of standard terms and conditions specified in these
contracts. The lack of uniformity presented by these recent decisions
must be resolved if the state and bidding contractors are to be able
to formulate their contracts with assurance. This comment will examine the most recent case law and discuss its practical effect upon
future negotiations.
THE PROBLEM

The public agencies representing the State of California generally conduct tests and obtain information as to various construction materials available and conditions to be encountered in the
construction of a particular road. These agencies have universally allowed prospective bidders to utilize this information in making their
bids, subject to limitations set forth in the construction contract. Providing this information without warranty permits a number of contractors to submit bids who, because of their relatively small size,
would be otherwise unable to do so. Thus providing the information
has a salutary effect of making the bidding more competitive, resulting of course in reduced costs to the state in the bids submitted. In
short, the existing system has proved mutually beneficial to both
interests.
Typically, construction contracts incorporate an exculpatory
provision which imposes upon bidders the responsibility for site
examination, warns that subsurface data in the state's hands is
available to bidders only for their convenience, and declares that the
state assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the data-it provides.2 Various interpretations have been made in recent years regarding the effect to be given these disclaimer provisions. Some
1 California Highways and Public Works, Annual Report Issue, Nov.-Dec. 1965.
2 A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State, 238 Cal. App. 2d 736, 754, 48 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237 (1965).
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interpretations serve a valuable function as a logical extension of
California's abrogation of the rule of governmental immunity. Conversely, some of the later cases in this area might well have gone too
far when analyzed with respect to current practices. Disseminating
the various imminent changes which could be necessitated should
lend authoritative guidance to those concerned as to the consequences which can be expected from failure to recognize the heretofore established judicial panoply of contractual provisions.
THE CASE LAW

A well established rule in California is that when the state
contracts with an individual, it is liable for a breach of its agreement
in like manner as an individual, and the doctrine of governmental
immunity does not apply.8 But as to the limitations which the state
may impose upon such liability by express disclaimer in the contract,
the cases demonstrate a marked divergence of opinion which in the
final analysis is best described as arbitrary interpretation on the part
of individual courts.
Probably the most common distinction drawn to determine the
weight attached to a disclaimer of responsibility is between inaccurate project information furnished as a "basis for bids" and that
furnished as mere "geological data."4 Some cases hold that a contractor who is misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued
by the public authorities as the basis for bids, and who submits a bid
which is lower than he otherwise would have made, may recover in a
contract action for extra work or expenses necessitated by the conditions being other than as represented.' Contrary to these cases in
such authority as Rocell Construction Co. v. State' holding that if
an agency makes geological data available under a disclaimer of responsibility, the contractor bears any loss occasioned by unexpected
conditions. Of course, such recognition of the state's right to limit its
responsibility is subject to the requirement that the state act in good
faith and avoid either intentional misrepresentation or withholding
of material information.7
3 California Highway Comm'n v. Riley, 192 Cal. 97, 107, 218 Pac. 579, 584
(1923); Union Trust Co. v. State, 154 Cal. 716, 728, 99 Pac. 183, 188 (1908);
Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 38 Pac. 457 (1894); Carmichael v. Riley, 56 Cal.
App. 409, 205 Pac. 478 (1922).
4 E.g., Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 508, 510, 370
P.2d 338 (1962); Gogo v. Flood Control Dist., 45 Cal. App. 2d 334, 114 P.2d 65
(1941).
5 E.g., United States v. Spearen, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918); Christie v. United
States, 237 U.S. 234, 239-42 (1914).
6 RoceU Constr. Co. v. State, 208 Misc. 364, 141 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1955).
7 Id. at 370, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
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Another court, in United States v. Johnson,8 asserts a distinction
where the contractor is specifically required to use a certain source
of materials on the basis of tests taken and referred to by the state. 9
This court reasoned that, nothwithstanding the disclaimer clause,
the representation in a highway construction contract that rock
suitable for crushing is available at a certain point, and that only
such rock is to be used is sufficient to establish a warranty upon
which the contractor might rely.'"
Other authorities, e.g., Flippen Materials Co. v. United States,"
emphasize the incumbency upon the bidder to be aware of the information provided in full detail. Such contractor cannot choose to rely
on some portion of the information supplied by the state, while at the
same time failing to look at other materials which qualify or explain
the particular segment upon which the contractor intends to rely. 2
In Montrose Contracting Co. v. County of Westchester," the court
allowed recovery by the contractor, but stated that if inspection
would have revealed the falsity of the county's representations, then
the contractor would not have been able to rely on the incorrect information, since the contract placed upon the contractor a duty to
study all subsurface information at his own risk. Similarly in City
of Reading v. Rae,'1 4 the jury found fraudulent misrepresentation,
but the court noted as dictum that it must be determined, if fraud had
not been found, whether the subsurface conditions could have been
discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the contractor.
Cases such as Flippen, Montrose, and Reading all have in common the basic element of ignoring the distinction between "basis of
the bid" and "geological data"; rather these cases base their rationale
upon a full integration of all the terms of the contract. In the light
of this full integration, if it is decided that the contractor has abided
by all the terms of the contract he will be allowed to enforce the
terms under which he seeks recovery. Thus, the state's furnishing of
information does not relieve the contractor of his duty to investigate
and assume responsibility for site examination, if so provided in the
contract.
Another line of cases, e.g., Day v. United States 5 and Phoenix
Bridge Co. v. United States, 6 takes the position that where one
8 153 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1946).
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.

11 312 F.2d 408 (Ct. C1.1963).
12 Id. at 413.
13 80 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1936).
14 106 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1939).
15 245 U.S. 159 (1918).
16 211 U.S. 188 (1908).
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agrees to perform for a fixed sum a thing possible to be performed,
he will not be excused or become entitled to additional compensation
because unforeseen difficulties are encountered. This latter view,
espoused in some of the older cases, rests on the rationale that whenever someone contracts to perform, he can never be sure that he will
be able to do so. Thus, the very essence of contract law is that two
parties take the risk which the contract imposes upon them, i.e., the
risk that they can fully perform. In view of the modern trend in
construction contracts to allow the courts greater freedom in interpreting the subjective "intent" of the parties by their language,
the absoluteness of such cases as Day and Phoenix Bridge in determining the scope of the undertaking by the literal meaning of the
words alone has become palpably obsolete in the majority of our
courts.
However, spanning a half century and looking at two recent
cases in the California District Court of Appeal, it becomes obvious
what the result has been of the "enlightened view" of subjective
interpretation by the courts. In an area which by its very nature
demands clarity and precision, we find confusion and conflict. The
two cases presenting this conflict are A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v.
State17 and Wunderlich v. State.18 Note that these two decisions only

highlight the problem as it has already clearly existed over the last
half century as evidenced by the divergence in the cases already
discussed.
The facts of Teichert 9 are directly analogous to those in Wunderlich.20 The defendant in both instances is the State of California
and the disclaimer provisions in the contracts are essentially the
same. 2' Both actions were brought seeking damages for breach of
17 238 Cal. App. 2d 736, 48 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1965).

18 241 A.CA. 58, 5o Cal. Rptr. 151 (1966). Note that this case will not be
found in the bound volume of 241 Cal. App. 2d, since it has been reversed by
Wunderlich v. State, 65 A.C. 830, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1967).

19 In Teichert, the plaintiff, A. Teichert & Son, Inc., a highway construction
contractor, had been furnished a materials report by the state describing moisture
conditions at certain points in the project area. Excessive moisture encountered by
the plaintiff, contra the state's report, resulted in excess costs and delay in installing
drainage facilities and in meeting soil compaction requirements.
20 In Wunderlich, the plaintiff, a highway construction contractor, relied on
samples taken by the state as to the consistency of particular material to be used
from one of two sites designated in the contract. The breach of warranty occurred when
the waste sand produced by plaintiff in their processing the native material was
greater than anticipated when they submitted their bid. The state was said to have
warranted the quantity of waste sand that plaintiffs would handle in producing their
products from the specified location.
21 In Teichert the court refers to section 2(a) of the STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS OF
THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, DIvisIoN OF HIGHwAYS, which was
incorporated into the contract and imposes upon bidders the responsibility for site
examination, warns that subsurface data in the state's hands is made available to
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warranty based on the state's disclosure of subsurface conditions as
ascertained by state employees. Similarly, in both instances the state
set up the defense that express exculpatory terms of the contract prevented any warranty from coming into existence.
In Teichert, the court sustains the state's defense by concluding
that the state's soil data was not furnished to bidders as a basis for
computing bids. This interpretation by the court, though of itself
sufficient to support their verdict, was supplemented when the court
specifically stated that the exculpatory provisions of section 2 (a) of
the Standard Specifications2 2 clearly demonstrate that the state did
not intend to make any warranty as to the information supplied. This
latter reasoning has no less support than Mr. Justice Holmes who
articulately stated in 19172" that when the scope of an undertaking is
fixed by contractual provision, it is merely another way of saying that
the contractor takes the risk of the obstacles to that extent. Thus, by
the view of the Teichert case under either of its two distinct rationales, the state will not be liable for information provided to bidding
contractors if the appropriate exculpatory provisions are placed in
the contract.
In Wunderlicl, the court chose to ignore the interpretation set
out by its sister court in Teichert, awarding damages to the plaintiff
contractor for breach of warranty. The Wunderlich court expresses
the opinion that it would not be reasonable to hold that the state, by
resorting to provisions of an exculpatory nature in the standard
specifications, could escape responsibility for the accuracy of information upon which bidders place reliance in formulating their bids.
The court concludes that in such circumstances it would be unfair
to relieve the state of liability by contractual provisions requiring
the bidder to investigate a source of materials which is designated by
the state as being satisfactory in nature. The court refers to
bidders only for their convenience, and declares that the state assumes the responsibility
for the accuracy of such data. Similarly Section 5(a) of the Standard Specifications
declares that the State Highway Engineer's decisions as to acceptability of performance and as to compensation shall be final. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 754, 48 Cal. Rptr.
at 237.
In Wunderlich, judicial notice was directed to specified provisions in the contract
stating:
(1) That the use of the site inspected by the state was optional with the bidder.
(2) That if the bidder desired to use such site, he had the obligation to satisfy
himself as to the quantity of material.
(3) That bidders may inspect all test reports made by the state, but subject to
the bidders' own interpretation of such information.
(4) That bidders are required to bid on the basis of their own investigation.
50 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
22 See explanation in note 21 supra.
23 Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159, 161 (1918).
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Hollerbach v. United States24 as its authority; though not expressly
stated in the opinion, presumably the court reasoned that the information provided Wunderlich was used as a "basis for the bid,"
since no deliberate misrepresentation or concealment appeared in the
facts. Since the discussion in Wunderlich as to the express disclaimer
clauses in the contract is limited to one paragraph without distinguishing any authority outside Hollerbach, the court apparently
chose to ignore the limiting clauses of the contract on the grounds that
the information provided was the "basis for the bid."
Regardless of what theory the court used in deciding the Wunderlich case, it is clear, considering the express language of the contracts in Teichert and Wunderlich, that a lack of uniformity of
decision exists between the two courts. Further, compounding this
inconsistency, is Teichert's approval of T. Kelly & Son, Inc. v. Los
failure to distinguish either
Angeles25 juxtaposed with Wunderlich's
26
decisions.
Teichert
the
or
the Kelly
Upon appeal to the California Supreme Court Wunderlich was
reversed 7 with Justice Peek expressing the basis of the court's decision on two postulates. First, in interpreting the language of the
state's contract, the court acknowledges the state's contention that
it was not chargeable for the loss caused to the contractor by the
material falling short of expectation. Since the contractor relied on
language which merely said that "samples indicated" the availability
of the site and further refused to make his own investigation as
suggested by the state, he could not be allowed to benefit by his own
negligence.
Second, the court reasons that regardless of what the statements
represented to bidders, the state explicitly at the outset of the same
paragraph in which the representation is found, disclaimed all responsibility for the quantity of acceptable material. In citing authority for their position the court turned to MacArthur Bros. Co. v.
United States,28 and in particular the rationale in that case which
pointed out that to hold the government liable for their approximate
specifications would, in effect, cast upon it responsibility for all the
24 233 U.S. 165 (1913). The Government was mistaken in its specifications as
to the backing behind a dam. The Government represented that the dam was backed
soft
by broken stone, sawdust, and sediment; but instead the dam was backed by
slushy sediment. In spite of exculpatory provisions to the contrary, the representathe
tions were construed as binding upon the Government and upon it rather than
contracter, fell the risk of the loss.
25 6 Cal. App. 2d 539, 45 P.2d 223 (1935).
26 Wunderlich v. State, 241 A.CA. 58, 50 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1966).
27 Wunderlich v. State, 65 A.C. 830, 423 P.2d 545, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1967).
28 258 U.S. 6 (1922).
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conditions which a contractor might encounter and make the esti29
mated cost of its projects an unknown quantity.
Though the supreme court decision of Wunderlich makes no
reference to the Teichert case, the approach taken by the court in the
former is remarkably similar to that in the latter lower court's ruling
and hopefully should lend considerable authority to the line of cases
which have chosen to deal with the contractual disclaimers of the
government as an express bar to action by the bidding contractor.
The best solution to the question presented by this confused
line of authority on how much weight is to be attached to express
disclaimer clauses in government construction contracts is best discoverable in comparing the practical results to be expected in
following either one of the two alternative positions established by the
cases. One draws the inescapable conclusion that the state must be
allowed to insert exculpatory provisions in their construction contracts with the assurance that the courts will take judicial cognizance
of such provision; and that perhaps the problem has finally been set
to rest by the overturning of the lower court Wunderlich decision.
State highway construction contracts must be awarded through
the system of competitive bidding if in excess of $5,000.00.o Competitive bidding has historically been favored and protected by the
courts and is intended to promote competition so that all contracts
can be let at the lowest cost to the public. In order that the bidding
process be effective, it is essential that the state as well as the bidder
be able to look to the terms of the contract for the determination of
contractual duties and responsibilities. Following the view taken in
Hollerbach and its progeny8 l the havoc to competitive bidding is
readily discernible.
A contractor who is aware of the advantage to be gained through
advantageous interpretation of the language of the contract would
be able to exercise unfair advantage over the other bidders. Such a
contractor would merely submit a low bid disregarding any risk involved in the project, gambling that he would be able to recover any
loss through litigation should any problem arise from unexpected
occurrences. Conversely, following the rule of strict interpretation
of the contractual provisions 2 or that group of cases following the
id. at 13.
CAL. Gov. CODE § 14256: "If the estimated total cost of any construction
project or work carried out under this section exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000.00),
the district or agency shall solicit bids in writing and shall award the work to the
lowest responsible bidder or reject all bids . .. "
31 E.g., Wunderlich v. State, 241 A.C.A 58, 50 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1966).
82 Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159 (1918); Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United
States, 211 U.S. 188 (1908).
29
30
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"geological data" line of thinking,83 each bidder would be required
carefully to include in his bid the element of risk if so imposed upon
him by the terms of the contract. If a contractor chooses to forego
the charge in his estimate, then he assumes the risk that his decision
contains, while at the same time gaining a commensurate advantage
over the other contractors whose bids reflect the cost of the calculated
risk.
Looking at another practical aspect of the problem, what would
be the result in an obverse to the usual situation? Such an example
would arise where the bidder over-estimates the cost of a particular
project and yet gets the job. There is no authority to be found and
probably never will be to the effect that a bidder must offer the state
a refund on his bid price if he inadvertently over-estimates the
difficulty of the job and is still fortunate enough to obtain the contract. In other words, the contractor can sometimes gain the benefit,
just as well as incur the detriment, from the occurrence of unexpected
contingencies. If the terms of the contract provide that the contractor
must bear the risk of investigation, it is only equitable that he be
required to do so, since under that same contract he will be able to
profit by the advantages which might just as likely happen to arise.
Furthermore, assuming the state cannot disclaim responsibility
for any information it gathers and makes available to the bidders, a
rather strange paradox arises. It has been held that the federal
government has a duty, if it has made borings or is in possession of
34
pertinent information, to fully disclose and furnish facts discovered.
Thus, by analogy, the state may be obligated, once it makes any investigations as to particular site condition, to make public this information. Yet, taking the view of the lower court in Wunderlich and
its predecessors, the state thereby becomes entrapped, since it cannot
protect itself by any contract provisions disclaiming responsibility
for such information.
Thus, the effect of the courts' refusal to uphold express disclaimer clauses in construction contracts can be to eliminate the
primary benefit to be derived from a public bidding system, which is
to enable public agencies to spend the least possible on construction
35
projects consistent with good quality work and material. In effect,
the failure to recognize express language in the contract rewards the
G3 A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State, 238 Cal. App. 2d 736, 755, 48 Cal. Rptr.
225, 238 (1965).
34 Leal v. United States, 276 F.2d 378 (Ct. Cl. 1960); General Casualty Co. v.
United States, 130 Ct. CI. 520, 127 F. Supp. 805 (1955) ; Ranieri v. United States,
96 Ct. C1. 494, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 690 (1942).
85 Brief for the County of San Mateo as Amicus Curiae, p. 7, Wunderlich v.
State, 241 A.C.A. 58, 50 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1966).
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contractor's lack of diligence and non-compliance with the contract,
since he will most likely receive the contract to the detriment of the
other bidders while the state is made to suffer the economic consequences should a failure of conditions occur. Ironically then, carrying
the system to its logical conclusion, the state can end up paying more
for the project's completion than it would have had a higher or even
the highest bidder been awarded the contract.
CONCULSION

The contractor is a free agent in deciding whether to bid upon
a contract; 36 it is apparent that the existence of protective clauses in
construction contracts has not hindered bidding by private contractors. While such provisions may seem to be harsh or place the state
in a position of superiority over the private party, such are the inherent necessities of the situation. The abuse which the state can be
subjected to in the absence of such provisions has been amply demonstrated by the above discussion. Conversely, it has also been shown
that the individual contractor will paradoxically stand less chance
of successful bidding the more accurate is his bid. Surely, the purpose
of the legislature in establishing the mandatory competitive bidding
system, as it currently exists in California, is to abrogate such
specific problems as are heretofore mentioned, and instead establish
a healthy and stimulating climate in which the best interests of both
the state and the conscientious contractor can best be served. The
improvident proscription of exculpatory clauses in these government
contract situations opens the door to those unscrupulous contractors
who wish to take advantage of the judicial interpretation to be found
in support of their position. Such a state of affairs can only result in
the drastic alteration or complete destruction of the entire system
through judicial interpretation.
Such a failure in the system will result in a greater cost to the
state in addition to leaving open a wide area of discretion for the
careless and unprincipled contractor. It can be argued that since all
contractors will have this advantage, the state is really the final party
to absorb the loss. However, if it is understood that the state will no
longer be able to supply the contractors with the basic information
it now supplies under the protection of the exculpatory clauses, the
illusory quality of the latter statement becomes immediately apparent. A large number of small contractors would simply not be able
36 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951): "Respondents were not
compelled or coerced into making the contract. It was a voluntary undertaking on
their part. As competent parties they have contracted for the settlement of disputes
in an arbitral manner." Id. at 100. [This case has no relation to the Wunderlch case
discussed throughout the comment-Ed.]
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to afford to involve themselves at the elementary bidding level. They
would not be able to afford the time, money, nor manpower, which
has previously been supplied by the state as a mutual convenience
to enhance the essential preliminary studies and investigations.
Thus, what at first glance might seem to be a state of the law favorable to contractors, will if carried to its logical conclusion result
in the exclusion of a large segment of these same apparent beneficiaries.
In light of such practical limitations on a state of the law which
does not recognize exculpatory provisions in state construction contracts, the best interests of both factions require that judicial recognition be given at all times to reasonable exculpatory provisions
which the parties see fit to insert in their agreement.
Russell L. Moore, Jr.

